By Saswat Pattanayak
Exactly 21 years ago, Indira Gandhi
was assassinated.
And as the war mongers have triumphed ever since, her
character sketches are being redrawn.
Latest one is related to the
Mitrokhin papers. Vasili Mitrokhin is no more,
but the defected ghost continues to hunt the lesser
politicians of India and even prompting some right
wing nick pickers to demand that they want to see the
Supreme Court inquire into the allegations.
Apparently the press world over have taken uncanny
interest in his work, claiming that he is the most
credible source to speak on KGB.
Of course, the serious observers know that Mitrokhin
is a disgraced KGB man. Even at the peak of Soviet
era, he was being assigned to accompany the Soviet
team to Olympic Games. In 1956, he was removed from
any field work related to KGB after his mishandling
of operational assignments. That was the reason why
he was shifted from operational work to archives work
and told that he would never be able to work on field
again (this indicates his failure as a operative of
any worth, and not again, being relegated to the job,
not an archivist anyway to begin with or skilled
with). Even as an archivist, he was known to be one
who stole documents. Traveling (not escaping or
anything) to Latvia, well after the era of communism
was over in USSR, his first door was CIA. Even in
1992, CIA did not consider him credible and no one
believed his fake documents. Clearly American
intelligence agency which had outwitted KGB scores of
times before leading to the demise of the communist
state, was dismissive of this man.
Finally he found a buyer in M16, an agency which is
less active than Indian RAW in the post-world war
period. And he found a publisher too. So much ado
about nothing.
The issues he espouses about India (that Indian
politicians have taken money from KGB) are pretty
stale and unimportant. Even if they were accurate,
there is no reason why anyone in the Congress Party
need to be ashamed. In the era of the Cold War, it is
an open knowledge that India was on principle
supportive of many Soviet stances than the American.
The way his book has now snowballed into a major
political controversy in India with the opposition
BJP demanding that the government should come out
with a white paper on the sources of funding of
political parties from abroad and set up an inquiry
by Supreme Court judge into the allegation contained
in the records of the disgraced KGB official, it
seems the right wing leaders of India are yet to
mature.
Unless of course BJP and the family support what
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were speaking
about Indians during the period. Of course during the
70's, the right wingers were all so glued to the
Americanization. Decades later, what seems obnoxious
must be sounding so just and sane to the right
wingers in India.
Is the issue at hand something about money that the
Soviet Union’s Ambassador in New Delhi from 1977 to
1983
Yuri Vorontsov has publicly declined? “It’s
rubbish! Indira Gandhi or her Congress Party never
took KGB money,” he said recently ridiculing the
Mitrokhin Papers. He has even further logic:
“Gandhi and the Congress as the ruling party could
have raised any amount of money through Indian
business houses and were not in need of foreign
funds. Yes, I know that the Communist Party received
funds from the CPSU (Soviet Communist party) like any
Communist Party of the world. It was never a secret
for anyone. They (funds) were transferred through
non-diplomatic channels, so I am not aware of any
transactions,” Vorontsov said.
Or is the real issue about Indira Gandhi’s decision
at that point: to support Soviet Union or to submit
to the United States?
Here are excerpts from Gandhi’s letter to Nixon:
New Delhi, August 7, 1971.
It is not for us to object to the United States
maintaining, as you, Mr. President, have put it, "a
constructive relationship with Pakistan" so that the
U.S. may "retain some influence in working with them
towards important decisions to be made in that
country." We have waited patiently and with
restraint, hoping for a turn in the tide of events
which the Government, Parliament and people of India
could recognize as a step towards a political
settlement.
I believe that the Government of the United States
supports the view that the posting of U.N. observers
on either side of the frontiers of India and East
Bengal could solve the problem of the refugees. We
regret that we do not see the situation in this
light. India is an open democracy. We have a large
diplomatic corps and many representatives of the
world press. We have had visits of parliamentary
delegations from various countries. All are free to
travel and to visit the refugee camps. They see for
themselves that although we are doing all we can for
the refugees, life in the camps is one of deprivation
and acute discomfort. Hence it is unrealistic to
think that the presence of a group of U.N. observers
could give any feeling of assurance to the evacuees
when every day they see new evacuees pouring in with
stories of atrocities. Would the League of Nations
Observers have succeeded in persuading the refugees
who fled from Hitler's tyranny to return even whilst
the pogroms against the Jews and political opponents
of Nazism continued unabated? In our view, the
intentions of the U.N. Observers might be more
credible if their efforts were directed at stopping
the continuing outflow of these unfortunate people
and at creating conditions which, to any reasonable
person, would assure the safety of life and liberty
of the refugee who wishes to return to East Bengal.
I should like to mention one other matter. Our
Government was greatly embarrassed that soon after
our Foreign Minister's return from his Washington
visit and despite the statements made by Ambassador
Keating in Bombay on April 16 and by the State
Department's spokesman on April 15, 1971, came the
news of fresh supplies of U.S. arms to Pakistan.
It was a sad chapter in the history of our
subcontinent when the United States began to supply
arms to Pakistan in 1954 and continued doing so up to
1965. These arms have been used against us, as indeed
we feared they would be. And now these arms are being
used against their own people whose only fault
appears to be that they took seriously President
Yahya Khan's promises to restore democracy.
In the midst of all the human tragedy, it is some
relief to contemplate the voyage of the astronauts in
the Apollo-15. These valiant men and the team of
scientists supporting them represent man's eternal
longing to break from the constraints of time and
space. As I write this, the astronauts are heading
homewards, back to our earth. We pray for their
safety and success. Please accept, Mr. President, our
warm felicitations.
I was glad to have your message regarding your
initiative to normalise relations with the People's
Republic of China. We have welcomed this move and we
wish you well.
And here is what Nixon and Kissinger were upto:
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met in the Oval
Office of the White House on the morning of November
5, 1971, to discuss Nixon's conversation with Prime
Minister Gandhi on the previous day. Kissinger's
overall assessment was that
“the Indians are
bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. To
them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I
found it very interesting how she carried on to you
yesterday about West Pakistan.” He felt,
however, that Nixon had achieved his objective in the
conversation:
“While she was a bitch, we got
what we wanted too. She will not be able to go home
and say that the United States didn't give her a warm
reception and therefore in despair she's got to go to
war.” Kissinger judged that Gandhi had been
thwarted in her objective: “She would rather have had
you give her a cool reception so that she could say
that she was really put upon.”
Nixon agreed:
“We really slobbered over the old witch.”
Kissinger felt that on matters of substance, nothing
of importance had been conceded: “You slobbered over
her in things that did not matter, but in things that
did matter, you didn't give her an inch.” Nixon and
Kissinger agreed that in the upcoming conversation
with Gandhi the approach to take was to be “a shade
cooler” and allow her to do more to carry the
conversation than had been the case in the initial
conversation.
(National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording
of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November
5, 1971, 8:51-9:00 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation
No. 615-4)
Now if there would have any reason for outrage,
Indians very well have one. When will the BJP,
keeping aside its hawkish mindset, get it straight.
Maybe this time.
Here is the telephonic conversation between President
Nixon (P) and Kissinger (K):
/1/ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations,
Chronological File. No classification marking. The
President vacationed in Key Biscayne, Florida,
December 3-5; Kissinger was in Washington.
December 3, 1971, 10:45 a.m.
K: Two matters I want to raise. It appears that West
Pakistan has attacked because situation in East
collapsing. State wants to use it as a pretext not to
put out statement/2/ at noon. I think it's more
reason to cancel programs. State believes and I agree
that we should take it to the Security Council once
actions are confirmed. If a major war [develops]
without going to the Security Council it would be a
confession of poverty.
/2/ Reference is to a
statement announcing
the cut-off of military assistance to India.
P: Who will object?
K: India and the Soviet Union.
P: So we have to.
K: Apparently no one else will. Even the
liberal papers are supporting that.
P: I am for that. We have to cut off arms aid
to India. We should have done it earlier. Allow India
bias.
K: Yes.
P: Sisco's part? He isn't pro-Indian. It's what they
want below.
K: Sisco has no convictions. Liberal, [omission in
the source text], socialist syndrome. The Indians
will just add-
P: I have decided it and there is no appeal.
K: I also think-
P: I wrote it independently of anyone and I am
surprised it hasn't been done.
K:
It won't reach the UN tomorrow or late
today. We shouldn't make a catastrophe of everything
we have done and why Indian actions
unjustified.
P: So West Pakistan giving trouble there.
K:
If they lose half of their country without
fighting they will be destroyed. They may also be
destroyed this way but they will go down
fighting.
P: They will have enough for a few days. It puts the
Soviets on the spot.
K: I think I should give a brief note to the Russians
so that they don't jump around about conversation
yesterday and say we are going on your conversation
with Gromyko./3/
A strong blast at their
Vietnam friends and behavior on India. We
are moving on our side but they are not doing enough
on theirs.
P: On India certainly but on VN I wonder if it sounds
hollow.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
P: Pakistan thing makes your heart sick. F
or
them to be done so by the Indians and after we have
warned the bitch. Their [omission in the
source text] and that but they have brought it on. We
have to cut off arms. Why not? Because attacked by W.
Pakistan.
Tell them that when India talked
about W. Pakistan attacking them it's like Russian
claiming to be attacked by Finland.
K: They will do it or we will do it from Key
Biscayne. It's a hell of a way but we can do it and I
will get that message to the Soviets.
Tags: Saswat, India, USSR, USA, Cold War, Imperialism